[CPEO-MEF] BIOWEAPONS: GAO report on perimeter security

[Lenny Siegel <lsiegel@cpeo.org>]

Biosafety Laboratories: Perimeter Security Assessment of the Nation's 
Five BSL-4 Laboratories
Government Accountability Office
GAO-08-1092
September 17, 2008

[For the original summary and links to the full report, go to 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1092.]
Summary

Biosafety labs under the U.S. Bioterrorism Act are primarily regulated 
and must be registered with either the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) or the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) under the 
Select Agent Regulations. Currently, all operational biosafety level 
(BSL) 4 labs are registered with the CDC and thus are regulated by the 
CDC, not USDA. BSL-4 labs handle the world's most dangerous agents and 
diseases. In fact, of the four BSL designations, only BSL-4 labs can 
work with agents for which no cure or treatment exists. GAO was asked to 
perform a systematic security assessment of key perimeter security 
controls at the nation's five operational BSL-4 labs. To meet this 
objective, GAO performed a physical security assessment of the perimeter 
of each lab using a security survey it developed. GAO focused primarily 
on 15 physical security controls, based on GAO expertise and research of 
commonly accepted physical security principles.
Select Agent Regulations do not mandate specific perimeter security 
controls that need to be in place at each BSL-4 lab, resulting in 
significant differences in perimeter security between the nation's five 
labs. While three labs had all or nearly all of the key security 
controls GAO assessed--features such as perimeter barriers, roving armed 
guard patrols, and magnetometers in use at lab entrances--two labs 
demonstrated a significant lack of these controls. Specifically, one lab 
had all 15 security controls in place, one had 14, and another had 13 of 
the key controls. However, the remaining two labs had only 4 and 3 key 
security controls, respectively. Although the presence of the security 
controls GAO assessed does not automatically ensure a secure perimeter, 
having most controls provides increased assurance that a strong 
perimeter security system is in place and reduces the likelihood of 
unauthorized intrusion. For example, the two labs with fewer security 
controls lacked both visible deterrents and a means to respond to 
intrusion. One lab even had a window that looked directly into the room 
where BSL-4 agents were handled. In addition to creating the perception 
of vulnerability, the lack of key security controls at these labs means 
that security officials have fewer opportunities to stop an intruder or 
attacker. The two labs with fewer security controls were approved by the 
CDC to participate in the Select Agent Program despite their weaknesses. 
During the course of our review, GAO noted that the three labs with all 
or nearly all of the key security controls GAO assessed were subject to 
additional federal security requirements imposed on them by agencies 
that owned or controlled the labs, not because of the Select Agent 
Regulations.
...

Recommendations for Executive Action

Recommendation: To further enhance physical perimeter security at BSL-4 
labs regulated by the Division of Select Agents and Toxins (DSAT), the 
Director, CDC, should take action to implement specific perimeter 
security controls for all BSL-4 labs to provide assurance that each lab 
has a strong perimeter security system in place. The CDC should work 
with USDA to coordinate its efforts, given that both agencies have the 
authority to regulate select agents.

--


Lenny Siegel
Executive Director, Center for Public Environmental Oversight
a project of the Pacific Studies Center
278-A Hope St., Mountain View, CA 94041
Voice: 650/961-8918 or 650/969-1545
Fax: 650/961-8918
<lsiegel@cpeo.org>
http://www.cpeo.org



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