2007 CPEO Military List Archive

From: Lenny Siegel <lennysiegel@gmail.com>
Date: 21 Aug 2007 21:39:41 -0000
Reply: cpeo-military
Subject: [CPEO-MEF] Communities and Chemical Warfare Materiel Disposal
 
[For a 2.2 MB, 19-page formatted version of the full report, complete with photos, go to http://www.cpeo.org/pubs/C&CWMD.pdf. - LS



Communities and Chemical Warfare Materiel Disposal

By Lenny Siegel
May, 2007

Prepared for the
U.S. Army Engineering & Support Center, Huntsville

The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this report are those of the author and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other documentation.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Center for Public Environmental Oversight (CPEO), a project of the Pacific Studies Center, conducted field work to evaluate community attitudes toward the various technologies and approaches to Chemical Warfare Materiel (CWM) response. CPEO Executive Director Lenny Siegel visited five communities where Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) have known CWM issues and interviewed stakeholders, including local, state, and tribal officials. The five FUDS were the American University Experimental Station, Spring Valley, Washington, DC; Amaknak Island, Unalaska/Dutch Harbor, Aleutian Islands, Alaska; Former Lowry Bombing and Gunnery Range (also known as Buckley Field), Aurora, Colorado; Black Hills Ordnance Depot, Igloo, South Dakota; and Former Camp Sibert, Steele, Alabama. The stakeholders who took part in this study were remarkably frank, and they offered valuable, though varied opinions about the technologies with which they were familiar.

CWM at Formerly Used Defense Sites includes actual chemical munitions, such as mortar rounds, artillery shells, and possibly aerial bombs; Chemical Agent Identification Sets (CAIS); bulk storage containers; and CWM laboratory debris. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has counted 100 or more FUDS known or suspected to contain CWM, and the number is updated periodically.

At FUDS, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for conducting the site investigations and subsequent excavations that lead to the recovery of buried chemical munitions. When suspect CWM is found, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers may call in Technical Escort Units from the 22nd Chemical Battalion. The Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project (NSCMP), a branch of the Chemical Materials Agency, may be brought in to destroy the materiel.

There are numerous technological options, some of which have been proven in the field, for addressing recovered chemical munitions, including Open Detonation, the Explosive Destruction System, Controlled Detonation Chambers, Stockpile Demilitarization incinerators, commercial hazardous waste incinerators, and the Large Item Transportable Access and Neutralization System. Chemical Agent Identification Sets may be destroyed in the Single CAIS Access and Neutralization System, the Rapid Response System, or commercial hazardous waste incinerators, and community education is a key response action at any location where the Sets may be been buried or otherwise discarded.

At sites governed by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Community Acceptance is a criterion in the remedy-selection process. However, the public at the studied FUDS are generally unaware of the range of technologies designed to treat recovered CWM. Many of the respondents, familiar with the CERCLA remedy-selection process, explained that they would expect to evaluate treatment technologies, at the sites within their communities, after hearing their respective advantages and disadvantages from officials of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and environmental regulatory agencies.

Those of the respondents in this study who expressed opinions generally opposed "incineration," the number one controversy at CWM Stockpile demilitarization sites because of concerns over atmospheric emissions. However, a number of people suggested that incinerators that prevent harmful emissions might be acceptable.

Most of the study participants believe that it is better to transport the treatment technology to the recovery site than to ship the CWM to a treatment facility. The Explosive Destruction System is highly regarded by those stakeholders who are familiar with it. Some of the respondents volunteered that it does not make sense to store chemical munitions on the surface. Most believed that education is an appropriate response to potential CAIS discoveries. Some felt that monitoring for emissions was a key part of any treatment system.

Experience at Stockpile demilitarization sites over the years illustrates how the storage and disposal of chemical warfare materiel and its demilitarization byproducts can generate intense emotional reactions from host communities. The Non-Stockpile Project has avoided such challenges by institutionalizing a give-and-take relationship with community activists, regulators, and others through the Core Group.

The key lesson of this study was that stakeholders' acceptance of CWM treatment technologies is primarily a function of the level of trust that they exhibit toward the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and other government officials at their sites.

To promote the development and/or acceptance of chemical warfare materiel disposal technologies and strategies at Formerly Used Defense Sites, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers should work to include public stakeholders from FUDS in the Core Group or a similar national dialogue on buried CWM response.

To ensure that trust is already established when site-specific decisions about CWM disposal need to be made, FUDS project managers must be prepared to work cooperatively with communities and reminded of the importance of developing such relationships.

If the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers anticipates, understands, and addresses up front the concerns of FUDS communities where CWM is found, it can accomplish its mission with a minimum of delay, expense, and controversy.


--


Lenny Siegel
Director, Center for Public Environmental Oversight
c/o PSC, 278-A Hope St., Mountain View, CA 94041
Voice: 650/961-8918 or 650/969-1545
Fax: 650/961-8918
<lsiegel@cpeo.org>
http://www.cpeo.org


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