2001 CPEO Military List Archive

From: Susan Gawarecki <loc@icx.net>
Date: 8 Feb 2001 17:23:42 -0000
Reply: cpeo-military
Subject: [CPEO-MEF] WHO Findings on DU in Kosovo
 
Reposted from International Justice Watch Discussion List:
<JUSTWATCH-L@LISTSERV.ACSU.BUFFALO.EDU>

WHO [World Health Organization] Findings on DU in Kosovo
1 February 2001

WHO Expert Team Winds Up Kosovo Visit on DU

At the request of UNMIK, a four person team from WHO has been in Kosovo
since 22 January, 2001, assessing any possible health consequences arising
from the use of depleted uranium (DU) in the shell tips of bombs used by
NATO during the war. The team was asked to present their conclusions and
recommendations as quickly as possible so UNMIK can take any necessary
action to deal with depleted uranium sites.

The team extensively reviewed all available information, visited DU sites,
and met with a wide range of organizations including health units  and
hospitals, KFOR contingents, medical and environmental NGOS and agencies,
and various UN and other organizations with a direct interest in depleted
uranium. On 31 January they presented a draft report to Tom
Koenigs, DSRSG-Civil Administration. The final report will be released
from WHO Headquarters in a week. But the general conclusions and
recommendations are listed below.

Conclusions of the WHO Experts Team:

1.      Depleted uranium is only weakly radioactive and emits about 40%
less radioactivity than a similar mass of natural uranium.

2.      Scientific and medical studies have not proven a link between
exposure to depleted uranium and the onset of cancers, congenital
abnormalities or serious toxic chemical effects on organs. Caution has 
been expressed by scientists who would like to see larger body of
independent (i.e. non-military) funded studies to confirm the current
viewpoint.

3.      Soldiers, particularly those at the site of an attack, are the
most likely to have inhaled uranium metal and oxides in dusts and smoke.
Except possibly in isolated instances, the general population likely 
would have not have encountered DU in this manner.

4.      The presence of plutonium in the depleted uranium used in Kosovo
has not been detected so far by laboratories analysing samples from DU 
sites.

5.      No firm medical evidence was found by the team to link
individual medical cases in Kosovo to exposure to depleted uranium.

6.      The present health information system on non-communicable
diseases in Kosovo is in a state of chaos in spite of the best efforts of
many people.

7.      There is a prevailing tendency, in the absence of a functioning
health information system and reliable population data, to speculate  that
each individual medical case may indicate a rising trend of illness.

8.      The presence of high levels of lead in people in the Mitrovica
region and the lack of means to implement a strategy for the long-term
reduction of exposure to lead, together with the alarmingly high rate of
traffic-related deaths, were both observed by the team to require urgent
attention by UNMIK and other organisations. Depleted uranium issues are
small in comparison to these involuntary causes of death or incapacity.

9.      For a typical type of attack site on soft soil only a very small
fraction of the depleted uranium from the penetrators is likely to exist in
the form of uranium oxides or metallic dust on the surface. Even if
dispersed, it would likely become diluted to background concentrations.  It
is not very soluble. So, even if some were ingested only a tiny  percentage
is likely to be absorbed in the body and even then, most what is absorbed
would be eliminated from the body through the kidneys.

10.  Over 70% of the depleted uranium penetrators at a typical attack site
on soft soil are likely to still be in solid form and buried at depths of
up to 3 m., isolated from human contact.

11.  The corrosion and degradation of depleted uranium in solid metallic
form occurs slowly over hundreds of years. For example, in soil containing
1.4 t of natural uranium per square kilometre, the entire, gradual
degradation of depleted uranium at the illustrative attack site would only
add about 5% to the natural uranium.

12.  The only sites where higher percentages of depleted uranium may be at
the surface are those with hard ground surfaces. These should be regarded
as the priority locations if or when any remedial measures were considered.

13.  The most likely way civilians could come into contact with depleted
uranium is through picking up objects from the ground. Consequently,
routine measures to remove depleted uranium objects from the ground surface
would be beneficial.

14.  The likelihood of depleted uranium entering agricultural products is
not known but can reasonably be expected to be small given that most  of
the depleted uranium is in a solid, very slow degrading metallic form.

15.  The likelihood of depleted uranium contaminating drinking water
supplies is unlikely.

Recommendations:

   1. Preparation of useful and realistic information on depleted 
uranium for distribution to the general public.

   2. Encouragement of the public understanding that penetrators should 
be treated with caution in the same way as any other type of munitions.
The public should be advised that if a penetrator is found, it be reported
to the authorities in the same manner as mines and unexploded
ordnance.

   3. Reinforce the terms of reference of the Department of Health and
Social Welfare Commission of Kosovar Experts to ensure that it is a focus
of an emerging technical capacity within Kosovo to advise UNMIK in the future.

   4.Utilise the Commission of Experts to bring together the local,
regional and international bodies to agree a common approach for an
improved medical data  recording system for Kosovo. This is urgently
required. A comprehensive health information system should be operational
as soon as possible.

   5. Mass screening of the population is not recommended on the basis of
evidence found in the literature, deductions made by the mission team, and
respected advice that was received. The team is sensitive to the strong
beliefs held by some members of the public. If these beliefs persist then a
more limited testing regime could be considered based on a medical referral
by a local doctor.

   6. The creation of an immediate, separate, cleanup programme at
depleted uranium sites is not recommended. Site surface cleanup should,
whenever possible, be part of planned, routine de-mining activities.  The
buried penetrators are unlikely to decompose quickly and hence, their
addition to the natural environmental abundance of total uranium in soil
will be small.

   7. Facilities should be made available to include the measurement of
uranium in routine drinking water quality samples taken by IPH for public
health monitoring purposes.

Longer-term Recommendations:

    1. UNMIK should make a firm commitment to recording and assessing all
forms of medical illness and prepare six-monthly public reports on the
incidence of all forms of illness initiated by whatever cause.

   2. Future environmental assessment and development planning measures
initiated by UNMIK should ensure that potential developers near or at
former attack sites are made aware of the possibility of buried munitions.
They should be given clear instructions on who should be notified if
ordnance is unearthed.
-- 
.....................................................
Susan L. Gawarecki, Ph.D., Executive Director
Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee
                       -----                       
A schedule of meetings on DOE issues is posted on our Web site
http://www.local-oversight.org/meetings.html - E-mail loc@icx.net
.....................................................


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